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1.       Introduction
One of the major economic challenges facing the Caribbean is the generation of
employment opportunities to reduce the high levels of unemployment experienced primarily
among the young and female segments of the workforce.  Although several reasons have been
suggested for the high levels of unemployment in the region, little attempt has been made to
rigorously assess the underlying causes of unemployment.  An analysis of unemployment
requires an examination of both the supply and demand sides of the labor market.
This research project focuses on the demand side of the labor market by examining the
impact which labor market regulations have had on employment creation in the English-speaking
Caribbean countries of Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Although a recent IADB
report on labor market reform in Latin America and the Caribbean indicates that the English-
speaking Caribbean countries have a lower level of labor market inflexibility than Latin
American countries, the regulatory environment in both the labor and commodity markets has
had some adverse impact on employment creation in the region (IADB, 1996).  Results  from a
study of the operations of the labor market in the Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic
Development (CGCED) suggest that these regulatory measures do have some effect on the
operation of businesses in the region (see Abt Associates, 1998).
Labor market regulation generally refers to the range of economic, social and judicial
measures and mechanisms that affect labor market outcomes and behavior.  Such regulation
emerges from the legislative machinery of the government, case or common law and the
collective bargaining process between labor unions and employers.  Labor market regulatory
measures cover such areas as:
i. the establishment and protection of workers’ rights
ii. the protection of the vulnerable
iii. the establishment of minimum compensation for work
iv. the assurance of decent working conditions
v. the provision of income security (see Table 1).
Regulatory measures may be direct (i.e., via the legislative machinery or government
intervention) or indirect (i.e., via the voluntaristic collective bargaining process or custom and
tradition).  While such measures protect workers from exploitation and poor working conditions,
they represent additional costs to employers.   The challenge for policy makers is to design a
regulatory system which minimizes the additional labor (i.e., adjustment) costs to employers
while protecting the socioeconomic welfare of workers in the labor market.  By minimizing such
labor costs, employers would be in a better position to hire more workers given other favorable
economic conditions.  It should be noted that labor market regulation represents only one
variable which affects the employment of persons in the labor market.
The main objectives of this research project are to:
i. document the range of labor market regulations existing in the three English-speaking
members of the IADB;6
ii. identify the costs implications of such regulations;
iii. empirically determine the impact which such measures have on employment
determination, using econometric methods.
This report documents the findings of research undertaken to determine the impact of
labor market regulation on employment in the English-speaking Caribbean countries.  Given data
availability, the empirical section only deals with Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.
The structure of the presentation is given as follows. In section 2, the institutional framework
governing the operation of the labor market is outlined.  The non-wage cost implications of this
framework are examined in section 3.  An attempt is made to develop indices of labor market
regulation based on the various provisions in labor regulation, and to a lesser extent in collective
bargaining agreements.  The incorporation of non-wage labor costs of a dynamic nature into
labor demand function is examined in section 4.  The statistical data used in the estimation
process are examined in section 5, while the empirical results are presented in section 6.  The
possible policy implications of the research are given in a closing section.
2. Institutional Framework
One aspect of the institutional framework governing the operation of the labor market is
the judicial or legislative (direct) aspect of labor market regulation.  The main areas covered by
this form of labor market regulation in the Caribbean include: freedom of association and
industrial action in the form of trade union activity, statutory regulation of dispute settlement (via
conciliation or arbitration), the enforceability of collective bargaining agreements, the
recognition of unions, alternative contracts of employment, national insurance and social
security, occupational health and safety, maternity and sick leave, holiday with pay and
overtime, termination of employment, redundancy and severance, minimum wages, gender
equality, equal remuneration and regulations governing the employment of children.  In addition
to these legislative measures, labor unions and employers negotiate collective bargaining
agreements which contain measures covering hours of work, shift work, the payment of
allowances such as uniform, entertainment, laundry and hazard, leave arrangements, manning
levels, dismissal rules (LIFO), training of workers and grievance procedures.  The nature and
extent of these regulations vary from country to country in the region (see Table 2).  Labor law
in the Caribbean is characterized by a “mixture of legislation, common law doctrines, custom
and policy.”
The institutional framework governing industrial relations in the region varies from a
model of statutory intervention as observed in Trinidad and Tobago to a voluntaristic model
followed in Barbados.  The differences in the institutional framework within the region have
emerged from the culture of trade unionism and the need to maintain labor and economic
stability in order to propel economic development.  For example, Jamaica and Trinidad and
Tobago are known to have much more militant trade union movements than Barbados and
Belize.  In Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and the Bahamas, there are statutory provisions making
all collective agreements legally enforceable, while in Barbados there is no such provision.
There are no legal provisions for the recognition of a trade union in Barbados, Belize and
Guyana.  The degree of unionization of labor varies from 13 percent of the labor force in Belize7
to 32 percent in Guyana (see Rama, 1995).  Although the degree of unionization appears to be
low, the labor unions still have significant membership in strategic sectors of the economy (e.g.,
public sector, ports, public utilities).
However, in all of the countries of the region, the original approach was based on the
common law, that is, the “voluntaristic” model, which is still observed in certain countries.  This
is an important factor in attempting to explain the relative lack of movement in labor law
regulatory indices.  The common law, unlike the civil law systems of Latin America, is based on
case law and is characterized by ad hoc formulation of legal rules and regulations.  In contrast, in
the civil law systems, law is characterized by legal legislation and the code, which are deliberate
forms of legal policy making.  This has had ramifications for labor law regulation in common
law countries as the defining characteristic in common law is non-intervention by government.
Labor regulation is therefore dependent on market forces and the strength of the bargaining
parties.  Legislation is usually relatively late in coming and, even where it occurs, it is often
distorted by case law.
Key concepts such as redundancy, the recognition of unions, the obligation to pay wages,
holidays with pay, etc. were left to the courts to determine.  This explains why before the relative
late-coming of legislation in the region, mainly in the late 1960s, the economic value of these
key concepts stood at zero as the common law had made no provision for them.
In this study we focus on three main areas of labor market regulation in the Caribbean,
namely, national insurance payments, severance payments and minimum wages.
National insurance and social security benefits are provided in all countries.  Benefits
cover such areas as medical care, sickness, unemployment, old age/pension/retirement,
employment injury, maternity, invalidity and survival.  Although there are differences in the
range of benefits provided, all the countries satisfy the minimum standards set by the ILO.  Both
employers and employees contribute to the  national insurance and social security schemes,
which can be considered as payroll taxes.  The contribution rates for employees and employers to
social insurance schemes are given in Table 3.  The payment of such contributions by employers
can represent a significant part of their labor costs, and several employers have been delinquent
in their payments to the national insurance scheme.  In Barbados, several employers find such
contributions relatively high and become delinquent with respect to their payments into the
national insurance fund.
The most contentious area of labor law in the region relates to the termination of  workers
and calculation of associated “firing costs” to employers (see Antoine, 1998, for a full
discussion).  Employment is usually governed by a mixture of contract and law.  Pure contract
law  principles which do not usually consider the peculiar relationship of the worker to his
employment may also govern the labor law environment.  For example, at common law,
termination is generally regarded as an essentially contractual concept.  This means that A
contracts to work for B and if he does not perform for any reason, such as poor performance,
strike or even serious illness, he has breached the fundamental term of the contract, and may be
lawfully dismissed.   “Summary dismissal” is termination without notice for such actions as
misconduct and breaches of confidentiality.  The common law presumption of  “dismissal at
will” still operates in the region with regard to the termination of employment.  At common law,8
a contract of employment can be terminated at will provided
“reasonable notice” is given.  If there is no notice, the terminated employee gets payment in lieu
of notice (e.g., one week’s wage or month’s salary).  “Wrongful dismissal” occurs where there is
no evidence for termination without notice (i.e., a contractual breach).  The issue of notice is
therefore fundamental to the concept of the lawful termination of employment at common law.
Although industrial courts and tribunals place some degree of constraint on the freedom
of employers to dismiss at will, Caribbean governments are considering the formal introduction
of ‘unfair dismissal’ which means that the employer must demonstrate that there is good reason
for dismissing an employee.  This clearly has implications for the future hiring and firing
decisions of employers.  Trinidad and Tobago, through its Industrial Court, specifies the concept
of unfair industrial relations practice, while Jamaica has provision for “justifiable dismissal.”
In both cases, reasons for dismissal must be given.  In Barbados, where an employee has been
dismissed without notice, the concept of “just cause” has been employed to determine if the
dismissal is wrongful (see Antoine, 1992; Cumberbatch, 1995a, b).  Damages for such dismissal
are paid via provisions in the severance payment legislation. It should be noted that workers
taking strike action in Belize, Barbados, Guyana and Jamaica can be dismissed. Good industrial
relations practice, however, reduces the occurrence of such cases, since firms seek to maintain a
reputation for being good employers in order to attract high-quality workers who can expect
some degree of job security.
In terms of payment for involuntary termination of employment, labor law provides for
severance pay (i.e., compensation for termination of employment for whatever reason) and
redundancy pay (i.e., compensation for termination due to the existence of economic or
technological difficulties). (See Table 4).  The “redundancy pay” concept is more widely used in
the region.  Redundancy or severance pay is treated as payment for past service, hence low
tenured workers are severed first on cost minimizing grounds.  Employers in some countries are
responsible for paying severance to employees when they are terminated and then recovering
part of the payment from a Severance Payment Fund (e.g., Barbados).  In Barbados, the
Severance Payments Fund is administered by the National Insurance Board.  Employers must
make severance fund contributions on behalf of their employees based on their insurable
earnings.  Employers are required to pay employees their severance and then claim a rebate
which is determined by the Minister responsible for the Fund’s administration.  In cases where
the employers are unable to make payments to employees, the Fund makes the payments to the
employees and then seeks to recover the amount from the employers.  The severance payments
system is not experience-rated, hence employers do not pay a reduced contribution to the Fund if
thy have a long history of non-severance.  In Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, there is no Fund,
so that the employer pays the employee the full cost of termination without a refund.
The countries under study in this project have enacted minimum wage legislation in the
form of either a national minimum wage (e.g., Jamaica) or specific minimum wages for selected
occupations (e.g., Barbados).  In Jamaica, a national minimum wage was introduced in 1975 as
part of the Government’s poverty alleviation program, and in recognition that several workers in
the non-unionized sectors were lowly paid.  The most recent increase in the national minimum
wage took place in July 1996 when it was set at J $800 per 40 hour week.  Barbados, Belize,
Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago have minimum wages to cover selected workers (e.g., shop9
assistants, domestic workers and agricultural workers).  These rates are updated on an irregular
basis.
Antoine (1998) also discusses other aspects of labor law in the region, namely, sick leave
with pay, holiday with pay, temporary employees, the protection of wages, truck acts and other
benefits, the employment of child labor, gender equality and equal remuneration.  These
regulatory measures form the general background against which firms have to operate in the
labor market.  Little change has taken place in these legislative measures over the years so that
firms have adjusted to their existence.
In summary, the institutional framework governing the operation of the labor market in
the Caribbean consists of a set of legislative measures, common law provisions (case law),
customs and traditions.  This range of regulations reflect the existence of two types of models of
industrial relations and dispute regulation in the region, namely, statutory intervention and
voluntarism.  Trade unions are particularly active in the labor market and are recognized in the
various labor laws.  The State maintains an oversight on the operations of the labor market in the
region in the form of legislative provisions and the operation of labor departments.  While
individual regulatory measures may affect companies (e.g., employers) differently, the overall
framework within which companies can hire and fire workers provides the basis on which
employment decision-making is made. Changes in labor legislation have not been undertaken
regularly.
The change in employment depends on the hiring and firing process.  Let Lo and Lt
represent the initial and current levels of employment (i.e., number of persons employed), then
we have the relationship:
Lt = Lo + H(@) - F(@) - (R)        (1)
where H(@) represents the hiring function and F(@) is the firing function.  R represents the number
of voluntary resignations and retirement.  Mandatory retirement laws will affect the R variable.
The discrete change in employment over the time period is given by:
˛Lt = Lt - Lo = H(@) - F(@) - R                                                                                             (2)
The change in employment therefore depends on the factors which affect the hiring and
firing processes.  Regulatory measures can either impose additional costs of hiring and firing
(e.g., severance, national insurance contributions and other payroll taxes) or condition the
processes (i.e., no discrimination in the hiring process, no child labor, LIFO or inverse seniority
in the firing process).  Understanding the factors which affect the H and F functions becomes
important in determining changes in employment over time.10
3. Non-wage Labor Cost Indices
Labor market regulations give rise to a set of labor costs which employers must take into
consideration.  Labor costs can be classified into (direct) wage costs and (indirect) non-wage
costs.  Direct wages and salaries relate to remuneration for work performed and include pay for
normal time worked, premium pay for overtime and public holiday work, premium pay for shift
work and night work, incentive or bonus pay and cost-of-living allowances.  Indirect or non-
wage labor costs consist of payment for days not worked (paid holidays and compensation for
holidays not taken), social welfare costs (contributions to social welfare and family allowances
paid by the firm), statutory social welfare costs (e.g., contributions to national insurance and
social security schemes), customary contractual or voluntary costs (e.g., supplementary
retirement and provident schemes, supplementary redundancy insurance scheme), benefits in
kind (e.g., housing, payment of utility bills), vocational training and special taxes and subsidies
(e.g., employment tax).
In addition to giving rise to  these wage and non-wage labor costs, labor market
regulations (LMR) also condition the environment within which companies must operate in the
labor market.  For example, legislation governing gender equality and equal remuneration and
the recognition of a trade union may not affect labor costs directly but may affect the decision to
hire and fire workers.  The existence of the gamut of legislative measures therefore gives rise to
the nature and structure of adjustment costs and makes the labor input a quasi-fixed factor in the
production process.
The wide range of regulatory measures makes it difficult to properly analyze their effects
on employment and other labor market variables.  In some cases, many of the regulations hardly
change over a long period and therefore have no inter-temporal analytical significance.  In other
cases, some regulatory measures are changed on a regular basis and therefore provide a ‘natural
experiment’ for empirical analysis.  Differences in regulation across countries also provide a
basis for empirical analysis.  In order to manage the range of regulatory measures, analysts have
attempted to develop indices of labor market regulation (see  Downes, 1998, for a full
discussion).  Two basic approaches have been employed by labor economists.  First, important
regulatory measures are identified and specific indices are developed for each measure (e.g.,
severance pay, minimum wage–i.e.,  Kaitz index–national insurance contribution or payroll
taxes).  Secondly, composite indices are constructed using either the specific indices or the
natural units of the regulatory measures.  These composite indices tend to be unweighted and do
not reflect the relative importance of the different measures in the employment decision.  The
technical solution to this problem is the use of principal components or factor analysis for both
qualitative and quantitative variables.
Authors have referred to LMR by different names.  For example, Rama (1995) refers to
LMR as an index of “labor market rigidity,” while Marquez and Pagés-Serra (1998) refer to them
as an index of  “employment protection.”  Loayza and Palacios (1997) have used a similar
procedure to obtain an indicator of labor market reform.
In Rama’s (1995) study of 31 Latin American and Caribbean countries, the range of his
“index of labor market rigidity” was 0.182 (Belize) to 0.654 (Brazil).  The indices for the11
English-speaking Caribbean are given in Table 5.  Although missing values for some of the
variables can affect the overall value of the index, the values of the index of labor market rigidity
in the English-speaking Caribbean indicate that Barbados has the highest degree of labor rigidity
in the sub-region, while Belize has the lowest.
Marquez and  Pagés-Serra’s (1998) index of employment protection for the six countries
in this study also shows how levels of protection compared with Latin America.  The range of
their index goes from 1 (little protection, e.g., USA) to 35.5 (high degree of protection, e.g.,
Bolivia and Nicaragua).  Four of the six countries in this study record values less than 10 (see
Table 6).  Loayza and Palacios’ (1997) study of labor market liberalization in Latin America and
the Caribbean also comes to the conclusion of low levels of labor market distortion compared
with Latin America.  They state that with a “common law tradition, the English-speaking
countries of the Caribbean, especially the Bahamas, Belize and Guyana, are the least rigid in the
region, particularly in regard to monetary compensation for dismissal, constraints on temporary
contracts and the rate of payroll taxes” (p. 17).
Although these composite indices provide some indication of the degree of labor market
rigidity, distortion or protection afforded by various regulatory measures, they do not provide an
indication of how specific measures affect employment.  As indicated earlier, specific indices
can be constructed to determine the impact of LMR on other labor market variables.
In this study, specific indices are used to examine the effects of labor regulations on
employment in the Caribbean.  In the case of minimum wage legislation, a Kaitz-type index
(KE) is used for Jamaica, which has a national minimum wage.  The index is given by:
                          Minimum Wage Index                   MW
KE = ------------------------------------    =      ------                                                        (3)
                     Average Compensation Index              AC
where the coverage ratio is unity (see Brown, Gilroy and Kohen, 1982, p. 499).  The traditional
Kaitz index is the ratio of the nomimal legal minimum wage to average hourly earnings weighted
by coverage.  For Jamaica, average compensation is used as a proxy for average earnings.  In the
case of Trinidad and Tobago, where the minimum wage legislation covers a selected number of
workers, an “effective minimum wage index” is used.  This index is given as the ratio of the
minimum wage index for those covered by the legislation to the average earning index.  Data on
the degree of coverage are unavailable
Simple  unweighted indices are used to measure the impact of  national insurance
contributions made by employers and employees in Barbados (because of the unavailability of
data for weighting purposes).  These contributions cover payments for severance pay, national
insurance and special levies.  The overall contribution rates are converted to index number form
using 1980 as a base.  Simple unweighted indices are also employed to capture the effect of the
payment of wage-related contributions to the national insurance scheme in Jamaica.  In the case
of Trinidad and Tobago, a dummy variable is used to capture changes in the NIS contributions,
which started in 1971, and changes in 1980 and 1982.12
Severance payment legislation has not changed significantly over the study period.  The
severance payments scheme in Trinidad and Tobago started in 1985 and has not changed since
that year.  In the case of Barbados, the scheme started in 1978 and some amendments were made
in 1991.  The scheme in Jamaica began in 1974 and slight amendments were made in 1986 and
1988.  With the exception of Barbados, where rates of contribution were changed, the
amendments have been administrative.
In this study, therefore, the analysis of the effects of labor market regulations on
employment will focus on minimum wage legislation,  national insurance contributions and
severance payments.
4.      Dynamic Labor Demand Functions
The employment of a person by a company involves various costs: (direct) wage costs
and   (indirect) non-wage costs.  Direct wages and salaries relate to remuneration for work
performed and include payment for normal time worked, overtime and holiday work, shift and
night work, incentive pay and family allowances.  While the payment for some of these items is
determined by legislation (e.g., holiday with pay legislation), the quantum of the payment is
determined by the collective bargaining process, where unions are dominant.
Non-wage labor costs are generally considered as adjustment costs and consist largely
of hiring costs (i.e., the costs incurred by the employer in recruiting employees) and firing costs
(i.e., the costs of terminating the employment of workers in an enterprise).  These non-wage
labor costs consist of the costs of hiring and training new employees, legally required social
insurance payments, severance payments, negotiated benefits and other payments.  The existence
of these non-wage labor costs makes labor a quasi-fixed factor of production.  An important
implication of these costs is that an enterprise has a choice between hiring more (or fewer)
workers and employing existing workers for longer (or shorter)  hours as production needs
change.  Once a set of workers has been hired, many of these non-labor costs become fixed
employment costs which do not vary with the number of hours worked as in the case of wage
labor costs.  Higher adjustment costs reduce the degree of new employment an enterprise will
undertake and increase labor hoarding within the enterprise.
The existence of non-wage labor costs has implications for the specification of labor
demand (employment) functions and the employer’s choice between the number of workers and
the number of hours worked per employee.  There are also implications for the incidence of lay-
offs by “skill level” since differences in such turnover costs by skill level can result in firms
being more reluctant to lay off “skilled” than “unskilled” in response to a decline in demand for
goods and services (i.e., skilled labor is hoarded).
The impact of labor market regulations on employment, as reflected in wage and non-
wage labor costs, has been approached from two directions:
i. The estimation of dynamic labor (employment) adjustment models whereby the role of
labor market regulation is implicitly captured in an adjustment cost function (see, for
example, Hamermesh, 1993, and Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996).13
ii. The estimation of labor (employment) demand functions  explicitly using specific or
composite indices of labor market regulation as explanatory variables (see, for example,
Lazear, 1990, and Erickson and Mitchell, 1995).
Dynamic labor demand functions can be motivated via the existence of adjustment costs
or the role of expectations.  These two factors suggest that there are several specifications of the
dynamic labor demand function depending on the nature of adjustment costs and expectations.
For example, labor adjustment costs may be symmetric or asymmetric with respect to the hiring
or firing of employees or linear or non-linear (e.g., quadratic) with respect to the rate of increase
in hiring or firing costs.  Expectations can also take various forms–adaptive or rational.
In addition to adjustment costs and expectations, alternative labor demand models can be
specified according to the assumptions made about the production technology used by the firm,
the vintage of the capital stock, the structure of commodity and labor markets and the
institutional framework governing labor market behavior (e.g., the existence of trade unions and
their bargaining power).  Recent literature on the economics of collective bargaining and trade
union behavior indicates several models which govern the negotiations process.  The two main
models are the labor demand model and the efficient bargain model.  There are two variants of
the labor demand model: first, the monopoly union model where the wage rate is set unilaterally
by the union and the firm determines the appropriate level of labor demanded (i.e., employment),
and secondly, the right-to-manage model whereby the firm determines the demand for labor after
the wage rate is determined by the bargaining process.  In the efficiency bargain model, the
union and the employer bargain over both the wage rate and the level of employment (see
Sapsford and Tzannatos, 1993 for an overview).  The choice of a particular formulation has
implications for the specification and estimation of wage and employment function.  Attempts
have been made to develop dynamic wage and employment bargaining models in the context of
adjustment costs (see Lockwood and Manning, 1989 and Modesto, 1994.  The specification of a
dynamic labor demand function must therefore reflect the institutional features of the labor
market and the behavior of firms in both the product and labor markets.
The standard formulation of the dynamic labor demand model emerges from the solution
of an inter-temporal constrained optimization problem.  Assume that the representative firm has
a level of employment at the beginning of a time period, Lo, and is faced with a cost of adjusting
the level of employment over time while seeking to maximize profit or minimize costs.  The cost
of adjustment may be due to legislative, technological or institutional factors.  If the level of
employment at some time period, T, is given as LT, then the problem facing the firm is selecting
the speed of adjustment to LT faced with an adjustment cost function and also the  level of
employment LT.
The optimization problem can be solved by using the calculus of variation whereby the
firm seeks to find the optimal path of employment over time (see Intriligator, 1971).  If we
assume that adjustment costs are quadratic and symmetric, that is, firing costs are equal to hiring
costs for all changes in employment, then we can generate one form of the dynamic labor
demand function (based on minimizing the intertemporal costs of production subject to a14
production function constraint; see Downes and Mamingi, 1997) given as:
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where the optimal demand for labor is a function of the price of labor relative to the rental price
of  capital  (Wt/mt),  planned or expected output  (q
*
t)  and a distributed lag function of labor
demand, D(Lt).  The specific form of equation (4) depends on the specification of the production
function.  As indicated earlier, alternative assumptions about firm behavior (e.g., profit
maximization), the adjustment costs function (e.g., non-quadratic and non-symmetric),
institutional arrangements (e.g., right-to-manage bargaining model) and production technology
can generate different dynamic labor demand functions.
One of the limitations of using equation (4) to determine the impact of labor market
regulations on employment is that all sources of adjustment costs are subsumed in the D(Lt)
variable.  One solution to this problem is to examine the nature and characteristics of labor
market regulation and infer a cost function that reflects the specific nature of the regulatory
measures.  For example, we can identify regulatory measures related to the wage rate (e.g.,
payroll taxes) and non-wage regulatory measures (e.g., no child labor, right to join a trade union,
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where w
a
t is a regulatory-adjusted wage rate and D(Lt)
a is a regulatory-adjusted lag formation.  If
indices are specified for these regulatory adjusted measures, then a log-linear specification of
equation (5) can be given as:
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where REG(W) and REG(NW) are regulatory indices associated with the wage rate (W) and
non-wage (NW) factors.  This formulation assumes that the speed of adjustment is determined by
the non-wage regulatory measures (REG(NW)).  Equation (6) indicates that the demand for labor
depends on the basic wage rate relative to the price of capital services, wage-related regulatory
measures (e.g., payroll taxes), non-wage regulatory measures which are the main factors which
make labor a quasi-fixed factor, planned output and previous level labor demand (which is a
proxy for factors other than labor market regulations which affect the adjustment process).  In a
truly dynamic context, we would expect some interaction between these explanatory variables.
As stated before, composite regulatory measures are not particularly useful for specific
policy analysis (i.e., should government reduce the minimum wage or cut severance pay to boost
employment).  In order to handle this issue, we need to examine the regulatory environment of a
country to determine the main regulations which are likely to affect employment over time (see
Zank, 1996).  In time series analysis, significant variation in regulatory measures can have an
impact on employment determination.  Across countries, significant variation can also have an
impact on employment generation across these countries and explain differences in relative
employment growth.   Lazear (1990) approached the study of the impact of labor market
regulation on employment by specifying the important measures which determine employment15
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where ri (i = 1, ...k) are alternate regulatory measures (e.g., severance payment, NIS payments).
Once we have enough degrees of freedom, we can estimate the impact of these different
measures on employment.  To the extent that there are still residual adjustment costs, a lagged
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D
*(L) reflects “residual adjustment costs.”
The latter approach is more useful for policy analysis than the earlier specifications of the
dynamic labor demand functions in that specific labor regulations can be highlighted.  While
some of the labor market regulatory variables can affect the basic wage rate (e.g., payroll taxes),
the focus in this study is on the effects of the regulatory measures on labor demand.  The
possible  endogeneity of the wage rate in the labor demand equation can be handled by an
appropriate choice of instrumental variables.
5. Statistical Data
One of the major problems associated with labor market analysis in the Caribbean is the
unavailability of data on many labor market variables.  The authors of a recent study of workers
and labor markets in the Caribbean lamented the unavailability of data to undertake a detailed
analysis of the labor market (Abt Associates, 1998).  Some countries in the region have
undertaken periodic labor force surveys to assess the performance of the labor market in terms of
employment, unemployment and labor force participation.  Many of these countries rely,
however, on population census data which are collected on a decennial basis in order to get a
comprehensive picture of important labor market features.
Ideally, a specially designed survey would be needed to provide data to undertake a
proper analysis of the impact of labor market regulation on employment at the different levels of
aggregation.
The absence of an ideal situation means that we must use the available information from
different sources.  Such a situation makes the results of the exercise somewhat tentative since the
databases may not be congruent.  A typical situation in the Caribbean relates to the data available
on wages and employment.  Wage rate data are usually collected from the administrative records
of the Labor Department and based on collective bargaining agreements while employment data
are collected from labor force (continuous household) surveys.
In terms of the database used in this study, only annual data are available for real GDP
for all the countries.  Data at the aggregate level are used in this study, although annual sectoral
level data for real GDP (constant price GDP) are available.  The data series for real GDP are as
follows: Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago (1970 to 1996) and Jamaica (1975 to 1996).16
Wage rate and average earnings data are available for only three countries on a
continuous basis: Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.  In the case of Barbados, the
Central Bank has constructed a wage rate index using data from collective bargaining
agreements lodged in the Labor Department.  This annual Wages Index is based on selected
areas of economic activity and is available for the period 1970 to 1996.
In the case of Jamaica, the Statistical Institute of Jamaica conducts a quarterly
Employment and Earnings survey of “large” establishments (i.e., employing of 10 or more
persons).  Data are available on both a quarterly and annual basis for the average earnings of
workers in “large” establishments for the periods 1976 to 1979 and 1986 to 1996.  Because of
this large gap in the establishment survey data, researchers have had to use the ratio of
employees’ compensation  in the national income accounts to total employees as a proxy for
average annual compensation in Jamaica.
The Central Statistical Office in Trinidad and Tobago publishes an index of average
weekly earnings.  This index was started in 1971 and re-based in 1977 with a wider coverage of
employees in sugar, manufacturing, oil refining and electricity.  Data are collected from surveys
conducted biannually.
Employment  data are collected on a quarterly basis from labor force surveys in the
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.  No ongoing survey exists in
Guyana.  Annual data on employment (and unemployment) in the Bahamas are available for
1973, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1986, 1988-1989 and 1991-1996.  No quarterly estimates exist for the
Bahamas.  Barbados has conducted a quarterly Continuous Household Sample Survey to collect
information on employment and other labor force data since 1975.  In the case of Belize, a “one-
off” labor force survey was conducted in 1983/84, but since 1993 labor force data have been
collected on an annual basis.  Employment (and unemployment) data are available on a biannual
basis (April and October) only for 1993 and 1994.  Labor force surveys have been undertaken in
Jamaica on a continuous basis since 1968.  Between 1968 and 1987, six-monthly labor force
surveys were conducted (April and October).  Since 1988, quarterly data on the labor force have
been collected.  Labor force surveys began in 1963 in Trinidad and Tobago on a biannual basis
(January-June and July-December) but there were no surveys in 1972 and 1976.
An assessment of basic data series for the six Caribbean countries covered in this study
indicates that annual data are available for Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago over the
period 1970-96.
The absence of wage/earnings data and a continuous employment series for the Bahamas,
Belize and Guyana means that they are excluded from the empirical aspect of this study.  Given
the low level of distortion caused by labor market regulation in these countries, their exclusion
would not affect the results of the study (see Loayza and Palacios, 1997).
In terms of labor market regulations, we have sought to identify the main regulatory
measures which are likely to affect employment in the three countries (Barbados, Jamaica and
Trinidad and Tobago).  In several instances, there has been little change in labor market
regulations in these countries.  Indeed, a recent survey of companies in Barbados, Belize,
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago indicated that labor market regulation was not an important17
labor market issue affecting their operations.  There was some concern expressed in Barbados
and Trinidad and Tobago about the high level of employer contributions to the social security
fund (see Abt Associates, 1998, p. 26).  The Severance Pay Act was also a concern to Barbadian
employers.  In this study, we have therefore focused on the impact of minimum wage legislation
in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago and social security payments and severance payments in the
three countries.  Data are available on the national minimum wage introduced in Jamaica in
1975, while a minimum wage index covering selected occupations is available for Trinidad and
Tobago.  Barbados’ minimum wage legislation only covers three categories of workers (shop
assistants, domestics and agricultural workers) who generally tend to receive more than the
minimum wage.
Payroll taxes in the form of national insurance contributions are available for Barbados
since 1967.  The contribution rates for regular employees and employers are available along with
the range of taxes paid.  The employer is responsible for the partial payment of national
insurance, non-contributory old age pension, employment injury, severance pay and
unemployment insurance.   Special levies introduced since 1981 are shared by both employers
and employees.  The limits of insurance earnings have been adjusted periodically to ensure that
the National Insurance Fund maintains an equality between income and expenditure.  Changes
were made in 1974, 1978, 1982, 1984, 1987 and 1991.  Unweighted indices of the rates for the
different contributors (employers and employees) are used in this study.  For Jamaica, data are
available for the maximum wage-related contributions to the national insurance scheme for the
period 1966 to 1996.  In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, the contribution rates have not
changed since the introduction of the  national insurance scheme in 1971.  The maximum
insurable earnings were however increased in 1980 and 1983.  Severance payment legislation
was introduced in Jamaica in 1974 and in Trinidad and Tobago in 1985.  No changes have been
made with respect to the payment of employees since these periods.  A Severance Payment
scheme was introduced in Barbados in 1973.  The contribution rate payable by employees into
the severance payment fund was raised from 0.25 percent to 1 percent of insurable earnings in
April 1991.  The maximum insurable earnings were also raised from $2,600 to $3,100 in October
1991.
In summary, the impact of minimum wage on employment is assessed for Jamaica and
Trinidad and Tobago and payroll taxes (national insurance contributions) and severance
payments for all three countries using annual data.  Little change has taken place in other labor
market regulations over the study period (1970-96) in these countries.
6.     Empirical Results
In this section an empirical examination of the impact of selected labor market
regulations on employment is undertaken using variants of equations (7) or (8). While annual
data are used for the three countries (Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago), the period of
investigation varies from country to country according to the availability of data.  In the cases of
Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, the period of investigation goes from 1970 to 1996, while
for Jamaica it is from 1975 to 1996 due to the absence of a national minimum wage prior to
1975.  The variables used in the exercise also vary from country to country according to the data
availability.  They are as follows: total number of persons employed (L), average earnings index18
(Trinidad and Tobago), average compensation index (Jamaica) and average wage index
(Barbados) (W), gross domestic product at factor cost at 1990 prices (GDP), real wage rate or
earnings/compensation (RW) defined as W divided by the retail or consumer price index (P),
minimum wage index (mw), the contribution of employers to the national insurance scheme
(NISCOR), severance payment schemes (SEV), effective minimum wage (EMV) is given as the
minimum wage index divided by an average earnings index (Trinidad and Tobago),  and the
Kaitz index is defined as the ratio of the minimum wage index  to an average compensation
index (Jamaica). (See Appendix 1 for a discussion of the labor regulation variables).
It is worth pointing out two major problems were encountered in this study.  First, the
exercise is hampered by the shortness of time series which, in general, can result in the low
power of test statistics as well as the invalidation of asymptotic tests.  Second, as outlined above,
the data used do not always capture adequately the concepts used in the theoretical analysis.
    The estimation procedure proceeds as follows:
i.  Investigate the temporal properties of the series using the augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) unit root test;
ii.  Check for the existence of meaningful long-run economic relationships via the Johansen
test for cointegration;
iii.  Estimate, if cointegration holds,  a long-run relationship between employment and a set
of variables using the Phillips-Loretan non-linear error correction model;
iv.  Use diagnostic criteria to evaluate the estimated model;
A comparison is made between the actual levels of employment and the projected levels
of employment with regulations kept at certain levels and without regulations.
All results are derived from the  Eviews computer program.  The  stationarity/non-
stationarity of the series is determined with the ADF t test. The following equation is used to
derive the ADF t test:
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 where  t y  is the variable of interest (any variable explained in the note to Table 7),  D stands for
the first difference, c is a constant term,   r  and   i l  are parameters, and  t e  is a white noise
series.  The null hypothesis  of   0 = r (unit root)  against the alternative hypothesis   0 < r
(stationarity) is tested using  the  r ˆ t statistic, that is, the ADF t-statistic that follows a Dickey-
Fuller (DF) distribution. The t-statistic values are compared with the critical values to decide on
stationarity or non-stationarity of variables.  When  0 = r , nonstationarity (unit root) is accepted
with a drift c; that is,  t y  is nonstationary with a trend for  ; 0 „ c  otherwise it is stationary around
a constant mean but has no trend.  The ADF t values for variables in levels ( t y ) as well as for
variables in first differences ( t y D ) are reported in Table 7.  The comparison of these values with
the critical values (see note to Table 7) indicates the variables in levels are all non-stationary at19
the 5% level of significance. The series defined in first differences are stationary following the
comparison of the statistics of interest with the corresponding critical values.  Note that the first
difference of gdp for Trinidad and Tobago as well as that of severance payments in Jamaica
seems non-stationary. We examine further these two differenced series using the Phillips-Perron
t Z test, a more powerful test than the ADF test, which also follows a DF distribution. The
Phillips-Perron  t Z  test uses a non-parametric correction to approximate autocorrelation in the
error term of the DF regression (the ADF regression without lagged left-hand side variables)
unlike the ADF  test which resorts to the lagged left-hand side variables to reach the same
objective.  The calculated values of the Phillips-Perron  t Z  are  –2.716 and –4.856 for the first
differences of gdp (for Trinidad and Tobago) and sev (for Jamaica), respectively.  These values
are greater than the critical values in absolute value; that is, the differenced series in question are
stationarity.   Overall, these results (non-stationarity in levels and stationarity in first differences)
taken together indicate that the variables in levels are all integrated of order one.
Since the variables are non-stationary, regressions involving these variables are only valid
if they produce stationary linear combination(s); that is, they are cointegrated.  Several tests for
cointegration are available.  The Johansen likelihood ratio (LR) test  for cointegration is used
here (see Maddala and Kim, 1998, chap. 6).   Although the LR test is a large sample test, it is
preferred over the Engle-Granger cointegration test  since it can reveal the presence of more than
one cointegrating relationship when dealing with more than two variables.
Given a cointegrating relationship between the variables of interest, we need to use robust
methods to obtain unbiased and efficient estimates at least asymptotically.  In this study, we
adopt the Phillips-Loretan non-linear error correction model 9see Phillips and Loretan, 1991).
The basic idea behind this procedure is to obtain the long-run (static) estimates of the parameters
of an equation by incorporating one or several lagged error  (equilibrium) correction
mechanisms, current first-differenced explanatory variables as well as their lags and leads.
Basically the following equation is:
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where  t l  stands for the logarithm of the number of persons employed,   t X   is a matrix of
explanatory variables (i.e., real wage, real gross domestic product, severance, minimum wage,
and  contribution to national insurance),  , 1 - - = D t t t X X X t u   is a well-behaved error term,
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j B B g  with  B as the backward shift operator.
The non-linear error correction model (10) achieves full efficiency “in the limit by
working to estimate (and eliminate) the effects of long-run feedback between the errors on the
long-run equilibrium relationship and the errors that drive the regressors” (Phillips and Loretan,
1992, p.426).   In this connection, the leads of  t X D  have an important role to play as their
inclusion allows to obtain errors that form a martingale difference sequence with respect to the
errors that drive the long-run equilibrium and the errors that drive the explanatory variables.20
This is useful for estimator efficiency, unbiasedness and for inference (see Phillips and Loretan,
1992, p.426 for advantages of this method over other cointegration techniques).   Maddala and
Kim (1998) also corroborate Phillips and Loretan’s views on the usefulness of the presence of
lags and leads in the estimation of a cointegration equation, precisely  when there is a unique
cointegrating vector.
In reality Equation (10) cannot directly be used as it stands; there is a need for truncation
to make it operational.  Given the small sample size, one lag and one lead of  t X D   and
B B 11 ) ( g = G  are used.   Thus, Equation (10) now reads:
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Equation (11) states that employment is affected by three components: the long-run
relationship with explanatory variables through the parameter 
'
2 1 ) , , ( K b b b = , the short-run
relationships with explanatory variables through the parameters  i a and  1 d   and the lagged
equilibrium correction mechanism,  ) ( 1 1 b - - - - t t X c l ,  through the parameter  11 g .   The
equilibrium correction mechanism, that is, the correction for the deviation from the steady state
equilibrium, may be justified on two grounds.  It represents not only an adjustment to the past
due to technological and institutional rigidities but also an equilibrium error resulting from
agents’ expectations or forecasts of changes in employment.  The latter stems from the
possibility that agents may have more information about the employment variable they are trying
to forecast than is contained in the history of the  variable alone (see Campbell and Shiller, 1988,
p.507).
Economizing on the number of degrees of freedom, differenced variables in lag or lead
forms are progressively eliminated if they do not contribute to the overall fit.   From the final
model we obtain the forecasts of employment with regulations, with regulations kept at certain
levels and without regulations.  Cointegration and forecasts results are reported on a country by
country basis.
6.1 Barbados
The following variables in levels are of interest here: logarithm of number of
employees ) (l , logarithm of real wage index ), (wr  logarithm of real GDP (gdp),  logarithm of
contribution to NIS (niscor) and severance payments variable (sev).  Other details concerning these
variables are provided in the appendix.
The  Johansen Likelihood ratio (LR) test in Table 8 reveals the presence of one
cointegrated vector among the set of variables mentioned above at the 5% as well as at the 1%
level of significance. The LR value for no cointegration (79.687) is greater than the critical value
(68.52) at the 5% level of significance while the LR value for at most one  cointegrated
relationship(45.405) is less than the critical value (47.21).
A parsimonious form of Equation (11) with the variables indicated above is used to
estimate the long-run parameters.   For reasons of space and also because the focus is on the21
long-run parameters, the coefficients of the lags and the leads of differenced variables are not
reported here.  Table 9, which contains the results of the preferred model, indicates that the
estimates have the expected signs.  Moreover there is no autocorrelation of errors as the LM test
in its F version with a p-value of 0.35 indicates at the 5% level of significance. As far as impacts
of variables are concerned, only gdp has a significant effect on labor demand, at least in the long
run.  Indeed, a  one percent increase in the real GDP brings about a  1.22% increase in
employment.  Changes in the real wage, contributions to NIS, and severance payments have a
negative but insignificant effect on employment.
A simulation exercise indicates that, had the levels of the payroll tax (niscor) and severance
payments remained at their  1970  levels or had regulations not existed, the levels of employment
could have been generally higher than the actual levels as indicated by Figure 1.  Statistically,
however, there are no differences in the levels of employment among the three scenarios since
the actual level of employment is always included in the 95% confidence interval  (projected
employment level  2 –  standard errors).
6.2 Jamaica
 The variables of interest are: logarithm of number of employees ) (l , logarithm of the
Kaitz index (kaitz), logarithm of real GDP (gdp), logarithm of contribution to NIS (niscor) and
severance payments variable (sev).
The  Johansen Likelihood ratio (LR) test in Table 10 reveals the presence of one
cointegrated vector among the set of variables mentioned above at the 5% (and 1%) level of
significance.  While the LR value for no cointegration (81.738) is greater than the critical value
(59.46) at the 5% level of significance, the LR value for at most one cointegrated relationship
(39.473) is less than the critical value (39.89).
The regulatory variables being examined here are the minimum wage (mw) through the
Kaitz index, the maximum wage-related contribution to the NIS and the severance payments
schemes.  The Phillips-Loretan non-linear regression results from Equation (11) amended
approach are presented in Table 11.  As the p-value of the associated LM test shows, there is no
autocorrelation of errors.   Real GDP is positively associated with employment.  A one percent
increase in real GDP brings about a 0.56 percent increase in employment.  Regulations, be it
minimum wage through the  Kaitz index, severance payments or contribution to national
insurance, do not have a significant negative impact on employment at the 5% level of
significance.
Figure 2 simulates levels of employment under two scenarios of regulations: without
regulations and regulations kept at their 1975 levels.  Concerning the first scenario (without
regulations), the results indicate that projected levels of employment could have been lower than
actual levels of employment had we used no regulations (see jlabo1).  The 95% confidence
interval on the actual labor level reveals that the decrease in labor resulting from the non-use of
regulations is significant.22
In the second scenario, levels of employment could have been sometimes lower
sometimes higher than actual levels of employment had we kept regulations (minimum wage,
contribution to NIS and severance payments) at their 1975 levels.  Statistically, however, the
differences between actual levels of employment and projected levels of employment are not
significant at the 5% level of significance.   Summing up, while the model is good for estimation
purposes, it is less performing in terms of forecasting.
6.3.  Trinidad and Tobago
The variables of interest are: logarithm of number of employees ) (l , logarithm of effective
minimum wage index (emv), logarithm of real GDP (gdp), contribution to NIS in dummy variable
(niscor), and severance schemes captured by a dummy variable (sev).  Niscor and sev are quantified
as explained in the appendix.
 The  Johansen Likelihood ratio (LR) test in Table 12 reveals the presence of two
cointegrated vectors among the set of variables mentioned above at the 5% level of significance.
However, if we use a 1% level of significance then the number of  cointegrating vectors is
reduced to one.  Given the nature of the enquiry we focus on one cointegrating relationship that
comprises all variables of interest.
Table 13 contains the estimation results of a variant of Equation (11). The  results
indicate that there is no autocorrelation of errors as indicated by the size of p-value (0.089) of the
LM test in its F version.  As for Barbados and Jamaica, gdp has a significant impact on labor
demand at least in the long run.   A 1% increase in real GDP brings about a 0.27% increase in
employment levels.  However, regulations be it minimum wage, or contribution to NIS or
severance payments do not explain employment levels in Trinidad and Tobago.
A simulation exercise indicates that if no regulations existed or the levels of payroll tax
(niscor), minimum wage and severance payments remained at their 1970 values, employment
could have reached higher levels than actually indicated  (see Figure 3).   Using the 95%
confidence interval on the forecasted value, these rates seem significant contrary to the spirit of
the model.   This basically means while the model is useful for estimation purposes, it is not so
for forecasting purposes.
The empirical analysis of the impact of labor regulations on employment in Barbados,
Jamaica as well as in Trinidad and Tobago indicates that minimum wage, contributions to NIS
(payroll taxes) and severance payments do not have an impact on the level of employment.  To a
large degree, these different results are by and large explained by a lack of significant change in
labor market regulation over the period of the study.  The key factor driving employment in the
three countries is output growth.
Despite the reservation put forward at the beginning of this section (shortness of samples,
particularly for Jamaica, reliance on large sample tests, and poor quality data), there are three
reasons that point to some reliability of results.  First, the econometric results in this study
corroborate to a large extent the results of a survey of employers in five Caribbean countries (see
Abt Associates, 1998).  The study indicates that “most companies reported that legislation was23
not an important labor market issue affecting their company”(p.26). The low values on the
various indices of labor market rigidity, employment protection or labor market distortion also
suggest that labor market regulation is not a major factor in employment determination in the
region.  The key to employment generation lies in output growth.  Second, the results derived
from annual data are by and large concordant with those with quarterly data (not reported here)
generated from annual data.   Yet, with large sample sizes, quarterly data results do not suffer
from the problem of “reliance on asymptotic tests.”  Third, and more importantly, a simple
before-after plot investigation of the effects of interventions in raw data also corroborates the
major conclusion of this exercise; that is, output is the key determinant of labor demand in the
Caribbean.   Indeed, Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 indicate that regulations do not have the expected
negative impacts on labor.  Labor and GDP do, however, move together.  This association can
unveil causality in the regression context.
7. Conclusion
 Employment creation has been a major economic challenge in the Caribbean.  The
existence of a range of regulatory measures has been identified by some commentators as a
source of labor market rigidity in the region.  This research project has examined the range of
direct and indirect labor market regulations in the region.  Although several regulations exist in
the countries under study, the overall level of labor market distortion caused by these regulations
has been small compared with Latin American countries. Furthermore, the adoption of the
voluntaristic model of industrial relations by a number of countries has meant that there has been
little change in the labor laws in the region over time.  For example, the severance payment acts
in Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica have not changed significantly since their introduction. The
econometric analysis of the impact of selected regulations (that is, the minimum wage,
contributions to the NIS and severance payments) on employment indicates that these measures
have had little statistical significance.  Output growth has been identified as a key factor in
generating employment in the region.
This study was limited by the small sample size in particular for Jamaica. One solution
might have been to pool data. However, pooling the data from the three countries is not advisable
here for at least two reasons. First, there is a lack of homogeneity in the measurements or
definitions of variables in some instances: for example, wage is defined as average earnings in
Trinidad and Tobago, average compensation in Jamaica and average wage rate in Barbados;
contributions to the NIS are unweighted index of rates in Barbados, unweighted simple index of
the maximum wage related payment in Jamaica, and a dummy variable in Trinidad and Tobago.
Consequently, interpreting the results from a pooled model becomes very hazardous.  Second, a
good or relevant panel data implies that the “country” dimension is much larger than the time
dimension.  This is not the case with our data.  Another solution is to generate quarterly data
from annual data to enlarge the sample size.  The problem is that while data aggregation rests on
a sound theoretical framework, data  disaggregation when only aggregated data exist, on the
contrary, reposes generally on a dubious theoretical ground.  Hence, given the nonexistence of
quarterly data and the pooling problems advocated above, the way out is to enlarge the data span
by collecting more annual data to obtain reliable estimates.24
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Appendix 1
1  Statistical Measurement of Labor Market Regulations
Barbados:
Severance Payments: 1970-1977 0 (scheme introduced in 1973)
(dummy variable) 1978-1990 1 (scheme changed in 1978)
1991-1996 2 (change in the scheme in 1991)
National Insurance Payments: Simple Unweighted Index of the Rates of
                                   Contribution by Employees and Employers
                                   (1970-1996)
Jamaica:
Severance Payments: 1975-1985 1 (scheme introduced in 1974)
(dummy variable) 1986-1987 2 (change in scheme in 1986)
1988-1996 3 (change in scheme in 1988)
National Insurance Payments: Simple Unweighted Index of the Maximum Wage-
                                                                Related Payments (1975-1996)
            National Minimum Wage: Simple Unweighted Index of the Minimum Wage
                                                     (started in 1975-1996)
Kaitz Index: Ratio of the National Minimum Index to the Average Compensation Index
                      (1975-1996)                                       
Trinidad and Tobago:  Severance Payments:  1970-1985 0 (no scheme)
1986-1996 1 (introduced in 1971)
National Insurance Payments 1970 0 (no scheme)
1971-1979  1 (introduced in 1971)
1980-1982 2 (changed in 1980)
1983-1996  3  (changed in 1983)
Minimum Wage Index: Simple Unweighted Index of Selected Minimum Wage
Rates
                                       (1970-1976)
Source of Minimum Wage data: Central Bank: Handbook of Economic Statistics,
1989, 1996.28
2. Statistical Measurement of Wages/Earnings
Barbados: Wage Rate Index (1970-96) – A Laspeyres Index which is the arithmetic mean of
wages and salaries indices for hourly-paid skilled laborers in selected sectors using a 40 hour
week as the basis of calculation.  Weights are based on the percentage of total employment
provided by each sector.
(Source: Central Bank of Barbados: Annual Statistical Digest, 1998)
Jamaica: Average Compensation Index (1975-96) – The ratio of total employees compensation
in the national accounts to total number of persons employed is used as a measure of average
annual compensation.  The dollar values are converted to simple unweighted index number form
using 1985 as the base year.
Trinidad and Tobago: Average Weekly Earnings Index (1976-96) – covers average weekly
earnings of employees in the manufacturing, oil, sugar and electricity sectors.
(Source: Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago: Handbook of Key Economic Statistics 1989,
1996)
In all cases the real values were obtained by deflating by the retail price index.
3. Statistical Measurement of GDP and Employment
GDP at constant prices were obtained from the national accounts of the three countries, while
employment data were obtained from labor force surveys.  In the case of Barbados, estimates of
employment for the period 1970-74 were obtained from Downes, A. and McClean, W. (1988):
“The Estimation of Missing Values of Employment in Barbados”, CSO (T&T) Research Papers,
No. 13, pp. 115-36.29
Table 1: Labor Market Regulation Measures
Type of Intervention Guarantees and Policies
Establishment and protection of workers’ rights right to associate and organize, right to bargain collectively, right to engage
in industrial action, right to contest dismissals, job protection during strikes,
conciliation and arbitration to resolve conflict.
Protection for the vulnerable minimum working age to avoid child labor, equality of wages and
employment opportunities, anti-discrimination policies covering race, sex,
age, disability, special provision for women (such as maternity leave with
pay), restriction on temporary contracts with respect to contingent workers,
paternity leave, occupational licensing, immigration laws.
Establishment of minimum compensation for work minimum wages, minimum non-wage benefits, over-time pay, bonus
payments, night work.
Assurance of decent working conditions minimum occupational health and safety conditions, maximum hours of
work with break periods, holiday with pay.
Provisions of income security social security provisions (disability, lay-off, old age, sickness), job security
and severance pay, wage and price controls, pension regulations, gratuity,
advance notice with pay, unemployment insurance, temporary provisions.
Adapted from World Bank: World Development Report 1995: Workers in an Integrated World, Oxford University Press, 1995, p 71.30
Table 2: Characteristics of Labor Market Regulation the English-Speaking Caribbean in the 1990s
Bahamas Barbados Belize Guyana Jamaica
Period of Prior Notice half to one month Negotiable half to one month half month 2 to 12 weeks
Payment for Dismissal with Just
Cause
0 0 0 0 0
Payment for Dismissal without
Just Cause
negotiable collectively 21/2 weeks for service between 1
and 10 years; 3 weeks for service
between 10 and 20 years; 31/2
weeks for more than 20 years
1 week’s pay per year of service




negotiable collectively 21/2 weeks for service
between 1 and 10 years;
3 weeks for service
between 10 and 20
years; 31/2 weeks for
more than 20 years
1 week’s pay per year of
service after 5 years of
service
negotiable collectively
Limit to Payment for
Dismissal
No Maximum limit to
monthly salary
maximum of 42 weeks no
Compensation for
Termination by Worker
None None for 10 years of service,





No Yes No no no
Probationary Period 3 months to 1 year Negotiable 2 weeks none 3 months
Duration of Temporary
Contracts
without restrictions Without restrictions without restrictions without restrictions without restrictions
Maximum Workday
(hrs/wk)
48 40 45 48
Charges for Added
Hours
50 50 50 50
Charges for Night Work nothing if ordinary
workday
Nothing nothing if ordinary work
day
nothing if ordinary work
day
Charges for Work on
Holidays (%)
100 for Sundays; 150 for
holidays
100 nothing if ordinary work
day
10031




Bahamas 5.4 1.7-3.4 6.8-8.8
Barbados 4.9-6.8 4.65-6.55 8
Guyana 7.2 4.8 10.5
Jamaica 2.5 2.5 5.0
Trinidad and Tobago 5.6 2.8 n.a.
Source: A. La Foucade: A Review of the Evaluation and Performance of Social Security Schemes
in the English-Speaking Caribbean, 1995, p. 32-3332




Antigua and Barbuda 1 year 12 days per year latest basic wage
Barbados 2 years 12.5 days per year for first 9 years
Belize 5 years 5 days per year with 42 weeks maximum
Dominica 3 years 5 days for first 3 years + 10 days per year for 3 to 5 years
45 days for next 5 years + 10 days per year for 6 to 10 years
95 days for over 10 years + 15 days per year for over 10
Maximum is 52 weeks
Jamaica 2 years 10 days per year for first 5 years
1 5 days per year for first 2 years
St Kitts and Nevis 1 year 10 days per year for first 4 years
15 days per year for 5 to 10 years
20 days per year for over 10 years
Maximum is 52 weeks 10 days per year
St Lucia 2 years 5 days per year for first 2 years
10 days per year for 3 to 7 years
15 days per year for over 7 years
weekly wage limited to EC $100
St Vincent and the Grenadines 2 years 10 days per year up to 52 weeks
Trinidad and Tobago 1 years 10 days per year for first 5 years
15 days for over 5 years
      Source: Baker, J.L. 1997. Poverty Reduction and Human Development in the Caribbean33





























15 12 55 10.6 - 49.6 - 24
Barbados 35 15 84 12.0 23 - - 31
Belize 27 6 50  7.0 - - - 13
Dominica 20 10 50  8.9 -  0.0 - 25
Grenada 25 - 50  8.0 -  0.0 - 47
Guyana - 12 59 12.5 - - - 32
Jamaica 25 10 56  5.0  7 21.9 - 24
St Kitts and
Nevis
- - 64 10.5 - - - 34
St Lucia 25 - 57 10.0 - - - 20
St Vincent and
the Grenadines
- - 55  7.8 - - - 12
Trinidad and
Tobago
13 14 55  8.4 - 30.8 - 28
     Source: Rama (1995)34














Bahamas 6.5  7  4.5 2.5 13.5 1 14
Barbados 6.5 14.5  7  4 35  2 14
Belize 6.5  7  4.5 11 33  3 14
Guyana 27 14.5 13 19 35 12 14
Jamaica 6.5  7 15.5  8 13.5 - 14
Trinidad and Tobago 6.5 27 22 23 29.5 16 14
Source: Márquez and Pagés (1998)35
Table 7: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test Results





















































Notes: l represents the logarithm of total employment; wr stands for the logarithm of  real wage
(ratio of nominal wage/earning/compensation index to consumer (retail) price index); gdp stands
for the logarithm of gross domestic product (GDP) at factor cost at 1990 prices; niscor is total
employer contribution to national insurance; it is the logarithm of an unweighted simple index of
the maximum wage related payment for Jamaica, the logarithm of an unweighted index of rates
(for employers and employees) for Barbados and a count data variable (with a value of zero in
1970, a value of one in 1971-1979,  a value of two in 180-1982, and a value of three in 1983-
1996) for Trinidad and Tobago; emv (effective minimum wage) is the logarithm of minimum
wage index divided by average earnings index for Trinidad and Tobago and  kaitz index is
defined as  emv for Jamaica;  sev represents severance payments; it is a count data variable
capturing the change in regimes; for Barbados, it takes on zero prior to 1978, one in 1978-1990
and two in 1991-1996; for Jamaica, it takes on one in1974-1985,  two in 1986-1987, and three in
1988-1996; for Trinidad and Tobago, it is  a dummy variable  with zero prior to 1985 and one in
1985-1996.
The numbers in the tables represent the ADF t test values derived from Equation (9) in levels
( ) t y  or in first difference ( t y D ).  For regressions in levels  with the number of lags  m=2   for
Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago (except for wr for Barbados), the critical values are : -3.734,
-2.991 and –2.635 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively.  For m=2 for
Jamaica, the  critical values are: -3.830, -3.029, and –2.655 at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of
significance, respectively. For m=1 for the Barbados wr, the critical values are: -3.720, -2.985,
and –2.632 at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.   For regressions in first
differences  with  m=1 (or m=0 for  wr D for Barbados)  and no constant  term,  the critical values
are  -2.67, -1.95 and –1.62   at the 1%, 5% and 10%  levels of significance, respectively.36
Table 8: Johansen Cointegration Test: Barbados
Test assumption: linear deterministic trend in the data
Series: l  wr gdp  niscor  sev
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Sample: 1970-1996
Likelihood Ratio 5% c.v.       1% c.v Hypothesized No. of CE(s)
79.687
45.405
68.52          76.07
47.21          54.46
None* **
At most one
Note: variables are defined as in Table 7. c.v.  means critical values. Hypothesized No. of CE(s)
stands for the number of  cointegrating equation(s). (*)  and (**) denotes rejection of the
hypothesis at 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
Table 9: Long-run Estimates from  a variant of Eq.(11) using the Phillips-Loretan NLS:
               Barbados, 1970-1996.











352 . 0 162 . 1 ) ( 937 . 0 967 . 0
2 2 = = - = = p stat F LM R R
Note: variables are defined as in Table 7. Short-run estimates are not reported here.  (…) are t-
statistics. NLS stands for non linear least squares.  LM test is the Breusch-Godfrey test for serial
correlation using the F-test version because of the small sample size. P-value is the p-value
associated to the LM test.
Table 10: Johansen Cointegration Test: Jamaica
Test assumption: no deterministic trend in the data
Series: l  kaitz gdp  niscor  sev
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Sample: 1975  1996
Likelihood Ratio 5 % c.v.        1% c.v. Hypothesized No. of CE(s)
81.738
39.472
59.46             66.52
39.89             45.58
None* **
At most one
Note: variables are defined as in Table 7; also see note to Table 8.37
Table 11: Long-run Estimates from a variant of Eq.(11) using the Phillips-Loretan NLS:
Jamaica, 1975-1996.











211 . 0 897 . 1 ) ( 964 . 0 985 . 0
2 2 = = - = = p stat F LM R R
Note: variables are defined as in Table 7.  Short-run estimates are not reported here.  (…) are t-
statistics.  LM test is the Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation using the F-stat version
because of the small sample size. P-value is the p-value associated with the LM test.
Table 12: Johansen Cointegration Test: Trinidad and Tobago
Test assumption: no deterministic trend in the data
Series: l emv gdp  niscor  sev
Lags interval: 1 to 1
Sample: 1970  1996




76.07              84.45
53.12              60.16




Note: variables are defined as in Table 7; also see note to Table 8.
Table 13: Long-run Estimates from a variant of Eq.(11) using the Phillips-Loretan NLS:
                Trinidad and Tobago, 1970-1996.
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Note: variables are defined as in Table 7.  Short-run estimates are not reported here.  (…) are t-
statistics.  LM test is the Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation using the F-statistic version
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Figure 3
Employment Levels in Trinidad and Tobago in 1,000
Tlabor:actual employment levels
Tlabo1:projected employment levels with no regulations
Tlabo2:projected employment levels with mw, niscor and







70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96
BLABOR BLABO1 BLABO2
Figure 1
Employment Levels in Barbados in 1,000
Blabor: actual employment levels
Blabo1:projected employment levels  without regulations
Blabo2:projected employment levels with niscor and sev
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                      Figure 6
Insurance (ijnis) and Minimum Wage (ijminwage)















                            Figure 7
Regulations [minimum wage(itminwage), insurance
and severance] and Their Impacts on Employment
(itlabor), Real GDP (itgdp) and Real Wage (itwager)
in Trinidad and Tobago, 1970-1995
Variables are in index form with 1975 as a base.














                            Figure 4
Regulations [insurance(binsurance) and severance]
and Their Impacts on Employment (iblabor), Real GDP
(ibgdp) and Real Wage(ibwager) in Barbados,1970-1995
Variables are in index form with 1975 as a base.
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                     Figure 5
Regulations[severance, minimum wage
(ijminwage, see Figure 6) and insurance(ijnis,
see Figure 6)] and Their Impacts on Employment
(ijlabor), Real GDP(ijgdp) and Real Wage (ijwager)
in Jamaica, 1975-1996
Variables are index form with 1975 as a base
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Figure 2
Employment Levels in Jamaica in 1,000
Jlabor:actual employment levels
jlabo1:projected employment levels with no regulations
jlabo2:projected employment levels with mw,niscor
and sev kept at their 1975 levels